管理中的機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)

摘要： 管理中不同利益主體間的信息不對(duì)稱會(huì)導(dǎo)致激勵(lì)扭曲等問題。如果不能設(shè)計(jì)有效的機(jī)制,則無法實(shí)現(xiàn)預(yù)期目標(biāo),甚至造成災(zāi)難性的后果。從管理實(shí)踐中的典型事件出發(fā),總結(jié)和探索造成問題的機(jī)制的主要缺陷;簡(jiǎn)述了機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)的基本概念、主要理論和發(fā)展過程。針對(duì)機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)在管理問題中的應(yīng)用研究進(jìn)行了回顧和總結(jié),主要包括單代理人或多代理人在靜態(tài)或動(dòng)態(tài)環(huán)境下的機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)問題。最后,討論了未來值得進(jìn)一步研究的方向。
Information asymmetry among participants in a managerial system may cause incentive distortion and other problems. If an effective mechanism cannot be designed, the expected goal cannot be achieved or even disastrous consequences may be caused. Starting from typical events in management practice, this paper summarized and explored the main defects of the mechanism causing problems, and briefly described the basic concepts, main theories, and development process of mechanism design. Moreover, it reviewed and summarized the application research of mechanism design in management problems, mainly including the mechanism design of single agent or multi-agent in static or dynamic environment. Furthermore, it discussed future research directions.