固定經(jīng)營(yíng)期下基于運(yùn)行績(jī)效的PPP項(xiàng)目服務(wù)價(jià)格形成機(jī)制研究

摘要： 本文研究PPP項(xiàng)目?jī)r(jià)格形成機(jī)制、補(bǔ)償機(jī)制及其社會(huì)效率。首先,分析了招投標(biāo)制度下固定經(jīng)營(yíng)期PPP項(xiàng)目服務(wù)價(jià)格形成機(jī)制及其不足。其次,基于成本與運(yùn)行績(jī)效的PPP項(xiàng)目定價(jià)規(guī)制及可行性缺口補(bǔ)貼思想,建立模型分析實(shí)施機(jī)構(gòu)可觀察PPP項(xiàng)目服務(wù)成本時(shí)的定價(jià)水平和可行性缺口補(bǔ)貼標(biāo)準(zhǔn);當(dāng)實(shí)施機(jī)構(gòu)無(wú)法準(zhǔn)確掌握項(xiàng)目公司的運(yùn)行成本時(shí),通過(guò)制度設(shè)計(jì)誘導(dǎo)社會(huì)投資者上報(bào)真實(shí)的運(yùn)行成本和運(yùn)行績(jī)效以獲得最大凈現(xiàn)值。分析表明,當(dāng)PPP項(xiàng)目服務(wù)需求彈性較大同時(shí)有可行性缺口補(bǔ)貼政策時(shí),政府進(jìn)行價(jià)格規(guī)制時(shí)項(xiàng)目?jī)衄F(xiàn)值高于不規(guī)制時(shí)的凈現(xiàn)值。文章通過(guò)實(shí)例驗(yàn)證了成本信息是否可觀察兩種情形下PPP項(xiàng)目的服務(wù)價(jià)格水平、運(yùn)行績(jī)效、項(xiàng)目投資凈現(xiàn)值及消費(fèi)者剩余。為了避免PPP項(xiàng)目運(yùn)行績(jī)效下降和社會(huì)福利損失,政府應(yīng)建立科學(xué)的監(jiān)督激勵(lì)機(jī)制,依據(jù)PPP項(xiàng)目服務(wù)成本與運(yùn)行績(jī)效的信息確定固定特許經(jīng)營(yíng)期下項(xiàng)目服務(wù)價(jià)格和可行性缺口補(bǔ)貼額度。
In this paper, a model is built to research the pricing formation mechanism, compensation mechanism and social efficiency in public project in public private partnership. Firstly, this paper analyzes the service price bidding price principle under the fixed concessionary period and its shortcomings. Secondly, since government constitutes public project controlled price feasibility gap subsidy according to the cost and operational performance of project company,we establish a model to analyze the pricing level and the feasibility gap subsidy standard when implementing agencies can observe the service cost of PPP projects, induce social investors to report the real operating cost and operating performance through system design to obtain the maximum net present value when the implementing agency cannot accurately grasp the operating cost of the project company. The analysis shows that the net present value of a project is higher than that when the government does not regulate price; when the demand for project services is flexible, the contract stipulates to subsidize the feasibility gap of the project company. Some conclusions on PPP mode service price, operational performance, consumer surplus, private enterprise's profits and social efficiency in different cost information and controlled condition are analyzed and verified. For the sake of avoiding the decrease of operational performance and loss of social welfare, government should establish scientific monitoring prompting mechanism,determine the service price and feasibility gap subsidy amount based on the information of supply cost and operational performance.