多市場接觸對新市場進入行為的影響研究——市場集中度與勢力范圍的調(diào)節(jié)效應

摘要： 中國的經(jīng)濟型酒店行業(yè)近年來經(jīng)歷了迅速的擴張發(fā)展,競爭格局不斷發(fā)生著變化,眾多經(jīng)濟型連鎖品牌酒店會在各個地理市場上遭遇彼此,相互競爭,公司之間的多市場競爭現(xiàn)象十分明顯。本文以中國經(jīng)濟型酒店行業(yè)中具有代表性的三家企業(yè)"錦江之星""如家""漢庭"為研究對象,以2007-2014年為研究期間,選取了285個地級市作為地理市場,以公司—市場為分析層次,研究了經(jīng)濟型酒店行業(yè)中公司之間的多市場接觸程度對于公司發(fā)起進入新市場的戰(zhàn)略行動的影響。結(jié)果表明:多市場接觸程度與新市場進入之間呈現(xiàn)出"倒U型"的曲線關(guān)系。當公司間的多市場接觸程度較低時,隨著彼此之間的多市場接觸程度增加,公司發(fā)起進入新市場行動的可能性將會增加,在這一階段起主導作用的是公司插足到競爭對手市場,獲取關(guān)于競爭對手更多競爭情報的目的;但當多市場接觸程度達到較高水平時,隨著多市場接觸程度繼續(xù)增加,公司發(fā)起進入新市場行動的可能性將會下降,在這一階段起主導作用的是公司彼此有能力進行多市場報復的戰(zhàn)略威懾力,從而導致了彼此之間的相互克制。本文也引入了市場集中度和勢力范圍這兩個調(diào)節(jié)變量,發(fā)現(xiàn)市場集中度增強了多市場接觸程度促進新市場進入的正向效應,減弱了多市場接觸抑制新市場進入的負向效應,使得倒U型關(guān)系的最高水平上升;勢力范圍對多市場接觸與新市場進入的倒U型關(guān)系沒有顯著影響。
The industry of Chinese budget hotels has experienced rapid expansion and development in recent years. The competitive landscape has been going through constantly changing. Because of the industry characteristics,all kinds of budget chain brand hotels encounter and compete with each other in various geographic markets,which indicates the phenomenon of multimarket competition is obvious.This paper chooses JINJIANG INN,HOME INN and HANTING INN,three representative enterprises of Chinese budget hotel industry,as research object and the year 2007-2014 as studying period. We choose 285 prefecture-level cities as geographic markets and define company-to-market as the level for analysis. We investigate the effects of the degree of multimarket contact on how possible a company would initiate a strategic entry into a new market from the perspective of dynamic competition. The empirical results show that the degree of multimarket contact has an inverted U-shape influence on new market entry. For companies that contact each other in multiple markets,the likelihood of new market entry will rise as the degree of multimarket contact increases when the degree of multimarket contact is relatively low. In this stage,the leading function is the goal of foothold in rivals' markets,acquiring more competitive intelligence of rivals. However,when the degree of multimarket contact is relatively high,new market entry rate will decline as the degree of multimarket contact increases. In this stage,the leading function is the strategic deterrence of multimarket companies that they have abilities to implement retaliate actions in multiple markets,which leads to the mutual forbearance of each other. The paper also introduces market concentration and sphere of influence these two moderate variables. We find that market concentration weakens the inverted U-shape relationship between the degree of multimarket contact and new market entry. The sphere of influence weakens the facilitating effect that multimarket contact has on market entry and promotes the inhibiting effect that multimarket contact has on market entry.